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ABSTRACT 
Social media sources are becoming increasingly important in 
journalism. Under breaking news deadlines semi-automated 
support for identification and verification of content is critical. We 
describe a large scale content-level analysis of over 6 million 
Twitter, You Tube and Instagram records covering the first 6 hours 
of the November 2015 Paris shootings. We ground our analysis by 
tracing how 5 ground truth images used in actual news reports went 
viral. We look at velocity of newsworthy content and its veracity 
with regards trusted source attribution. We also examine temporal 
segmentation combined with statistical frequency counters to 
identify likely eyewitness content for input to real-time breaking 
content feeds. Our results suggest attribution to trusted sources 
might be a good indicator of content veracity, and that temporal 
segmentation coupled with frequency statistical metrics could be 
used to highlight in real-time eyewitness content if applied with 
some additional text filters. 
CCS Concepts 
H.3.1 [Content Analysis and Indexing]: Linguistic processing; 
I.2.7 [Artificial Intelligence]: Natural Language Processing - Text 
analysis; I.2.7 [Artificial Intelligence]: Knowledge representation 
and reasoning 
Keywords 
Velocity; Veracity; Trust; Credibility; Natural Language 
Processing; Semantics; Social Media; User Generated Content; 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Social media sources are becoming increasingly important and 
pervasive within the field of journalism. Before user generated 
content (UGC) can be used it must be identified, verified and 
integrated into the final news story. In breaking news the deadlines 
are measured in minutes not days, so tools which can automate 
parts of this process are very important when journalists are 
confronted with millions of possible social media content items to 
filter and analyse. Competition is fierce between journalists and 
kudos goes to the one who publishes breaking news first; 
shortcutting verification steps however risks publishing rumour as 
truth and can ruin a journalist’s professional reputation. It is 
                                                                 
 
 
 
 
important that journalists find and verify user generated content 
quickly and correctly. 
Of particular interest to breaking news stories are images and 
videos from eyewitnesses at the scene of an event. These are often 
uploaded to media sharing sites and/or social media sites as the 
news event unfolds. Journalists find these images and videos by 
monitoring known sources (e.g. real-time feeds based on curated 
sources in Twitter lists), trending content (e.g. searches based on 
Twitter trending hashtags) and active keyword searches (e.g. 
Twitter search). Once an eyewitness image or video is found a 
journalist will typically [1] look for the original posting, contact the 
author of this post and then ask some questions to verify that they 
are indeed the true author. Lastly they will ask for permission to 
publish the content in their news story. 
Dashboard applications such as TweetDeck1 and Storyful2 
make it easier for users to manage real-time streams of social media 
content with the hope of finding eyewitness and newsworthy 
content soon after it is posted. These tools allow management of 
multiple keyword filtered streams. Image search tools such as 
TinEye3 and Google Reverse Image Search4 are used by journalists 
to find duplicates, such as other posts of same image, and near 
duplicates, such as posts before or after potential Photoshop 
manipulations, to help find fake posts. If the original image is 
located its metadata can be used to extract facts, for example the 
make and model of image recording device, which can be 
confirmed by the author when they are contacted. 
Approaches to faking [2] include digital manipulation, 
recycling old content as breaking news and misrepresentation of 
genuine content. For example TV banners can be added to make a 
video look like it came from a trusted source, old war footage 
recycled in more recent conflicts or images from innocent accidents 
presented in ways that support claims of foul play. A journalist will 
ultimately use human judgement to decide if content items are 
genuine or not, however tools can help a lot in this process by 
providing relevant contextual evidence to base decisions upon. 
Understanding the dynamics of how newsworthy content goes 
viral is important to developing better tools to support the 
identification and verification processes. We present in this paper 
our analysis of the first 6 hours of the November 2015 Paris 
shootings, looking at content crawled from Twitter, You Tube and 
Instagram. Our qualitative analysis is anchored to 5 ground truth 
1 https://tweetdeck.twitter.com 
2 https://storyful.com 
3 https://www.tineye.com 
4 https://images.google.com 
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social media images that appeared in broadcast news stories during 
the event, including 3 genuine images and 2 fake images that were 
debunked shortly after being broadcast. To look at the velocity of 
newsworthy content we temporally segment our dataset and show 
metrics for mentions of ground truth images over time. We report 
metrics for both the original image and duplicates found using 
TinEye. With regards to veracity we look at which percentage of 
these mentions were from either trusted sources directly, or 
attributed to trusted sources indirectly. We lastly look at supporting 
real-time eyewitness content identification by examining how 
temporal segmentation, combined with statistical frequency 
counters, can be used to find real-time lists of original breaking 
content which are likely to contain eyewitness images and videos. 
This latter approach has the potential to dramatically reduce the 
volume of content journalists need to monitor, allowing them more 
time to get the verification work finished. 
The novelty of this work derives from our large scale analysis 
of the first hours of a real breaking news story, as opposed to time 
periods well after the story breaks which is much more common in 
the published literature. Previously published large scale work 
involving breaking news typically involves traffic analysis and user 
mention graphs, and nothing at the deeper content-level. Published 
work at a deeper content-level focuses on benchmark datasets, 
small in size (i.e. only thousands of content items) and usually 
manually extracted and labelled. We provide a large scale content-
level analysis of 38 GB of content, fully covering the first 6 hours 
of the Paris shootings event, which we hope practitioners and 
researchers can use in the future to help guide news analysis tool 
development. 
We outline in section 2 related work and our analysis approach 
in section 3. The experiment setup and results are described in 
section 4, with discussion and conclusions in sections 5 and 6. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Published social media analytics during news events is mostly 
focussed on Twitter, using data from traffic analysis and sentiment 
analysis techniques to look into specific case studies. An example 
of analysis on a breaking news story is [6], where keywords are 
used to look at tweet sentiment (e.g. certain, uncertain) in reports 
of the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2010 both before, during and 
after the event. This analysis is small-scale (i.e. about 900 tweets) 
using a manually labelled dataset. A larger-scale analysis [7] 
looked at 4 million tweets from 5,000 sources crawled during the 
2012 US election. This work analysed temporal traffic metrics (e.g. 
tweets per minute) during key political events such as Barack 
Obama’s victory tweet. Another large scale analysis [8] looked at 
the 2011 UK summer riots, analysing 2.6 million tweets. This work 
showed that journalists and mainstream media posted the majority 
of content with a long tail of ‘silent majority’ readers, with an in-
depth analysis of posts from two ‘at the scene’ journalists providing 
a qualitative insight into how eyewitness media reports went viral. 
Some approaches use visualizations to help users trace back 
content to the original post. An example is [9] where clustered 
tweet propagation from a target tweet is displayed on a timeline. 
This system uses the Twitter Search API, and is limited to data 
crawled within the 7 day window in the same way our work is. 
Another work [10] has examined overlaying social network 
interconnections to temporal graphs of rumour retweets, revealing 
active users in both graphs during propagation periods as the 
rumours goes viral. These works lack deep content-level analysis, 
such as the extraction of attributed sources that we show. 
3. METHOD 
We used a number of previously developed analytics tools to crawl 
and process the Paris shootings datasets, as described in Figure 1. 
This paper only reports the results of our analysis work, and does 
not contain details of the technical approaches used; interested 
readers can find such details in [3], [4] and [5]. 
Figure 1. Analytics Technical Workflow 
 
We crawled our dataset using the Twitter, YouTube and 
Instagram search APIs. We used our own crawler software [4] [5] 
with Twitter hashtag filters of ‘#Paris’ and ‘#ParisShootings’ and 
YouTube/Instagram location filters for Paris. Since we crawled 
within 7 days of the Paris shootings this allowing us to execute full 
historical searches, gradually paging the results back in time until 
the target start date. We extracted 6 hours (i.e. 38 GB) of historical 
content this way, including full coverage of the event start time (i.e. 
a period from 13-11-2015 20:20:00 UTC to 14-11-2015 02:00:00 
UTC). This volume of social media content we obtained this way 
is much larger than is available using the Twitter Streaming API, 
which only runs on a small sample of the firehose, and we were 
able to approach levels available to services with full Twitter 
firehose access. 
Our analysis software processed the JSON metadata for each 
content item, extracting the timestamp, author, media and textual 
components. The text went through a natural language processing 
pipeline [3], involving named entity extraction and relational 
extraction, to extract mentions of attributed entities like ‘BBC 
News’. Each content item was then stored in a PostgreSQL 
database and cross-indexed to each extracted entity (i.e. author, 
attributed entity, media links). This then allowed SQL queries to be 
executed to temporally segment the dataset (e.g. 5 minutes 
segments) and return ranked lists of trending authors, entities and 
media links for each temporal segment. We finally imported 
temporal segments of the data into a knowledge-based model we 
have created. This knowledge-model associates authors and 
attributed entities to a-priori declared trusted sources, allowing 
different levels of trusted content items to be inferred. 
Crawler
-  Twitter search API
-  YouTube search API
-  Instagram search API 
Tokenization
-  Parts of Speech (POS ) tagging
-  Language Filter (English , French ) 
Aggregation and Indexing 
-  PostgreSQL database
Trust model
-  GraphDB triple store 
-  OWL Knowledge Model 
  + TrustedSource  (prior knowledge ) 
  + ContentItem 
  + TrustedContent ( inference ) 
Named Entity Extraction 
Relational Extraction
-  Author Entities 
-  Attributed Entities 
Temporal Segmentation
-  Statistical Metrics 
-  Breaking Content URIs 
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4. EXPERIMENT 
4.1 Experiment setup 
For our ground truth we compiled a list of (un)trusted sources, i.e. 
sources we defined in to be either trusted or untrusted. News 
organisations such as BBC Breaking have in the range of 30 
specialised lists of sources5, each with about 200 names. For our 
qualitative evaluation we created a list of 49 trusted and 18 
untrusted sources, using sources which appeared with a high 
frequency in our dataset to reduce the manual effort in creating the 
list. Our trusted sources focus on large news channels such as BBC 
or CNN. Our untrusted sources are smaller news agencies or 
individual journalists with a history of spreading false rumours. We 
import these lists into our knowledge base along with the actual 
content. Trust related information is stored as a separate RDF graph 
to represent a viewpoint, since different journalists would have 
different trusted source lists for different purposes (e.g. one list for 
news related to American politics, another one for international 
sports or military operations). 
4.2 Experiment method 
For each test case we imported relevant content items from a 
PostgreSQL indexed content database for the crawled news story 
into a GraphDB triple store. Then then used our trust model 
application to run queries on the database and/or triple store to 
generate results. 
For each of the 5 target images as shown in table 1 we created 
an expanded set of URIs consisting of the original post and 
duplicates found using a TinEye reverse image search. Each 
expanded list of URIs was then used to filter content in our queries 
to only those posts embedding or linking to the target images. All 
of these pictures appear in ground truth news articles with and 
without attribution to the original author. 
Table 1. Statistical information about the selected tweets and 
their authors and whether the investigated tweet was crawled 
as part of our dataset. 
 
In our first experiment we ran queries on 10 minute temporal 
segments starting from the first mention of each target image in our 
dataset. This data was imported into our trust model allowing 
trusted authors, and attributions to trusted sources to be analysed. 
The aim of this experiment was to examine the first hour of content 
mentioning each target image, breaking it down into total mentions 
and mentions from, or attributed to, (un)trusted sources. This is 
relevant to journalists trying to identify verified content soon after 
it is published, which might have contextual relevance to an event 
under investigation. 
In our second experiment queries were run on the first 5 
minutes of each target image in our dataset, ranking content by 
                                                                 
 
 
mention frequency and removing all content that has appeared 
previously before the 5 minute target window. The ranked list of 
images was correlated to the target image expanded URI set to see 
how far up the ranking each target image came. The top 100 content 
items in each ranked list were also manually inspected to discover 
what percentage were eyewitness images and/or videos relating to 
the Paris shootings. The aim of this experiment is to examine if a 
combination of temporal segmentation and ranking could be used 
to support a real-time news feed for new unpublished eyewitness 
content and how much noise there might be for journalists to tackle. 
These experiments were executed on a single machine (64bit 
Ubuntu 14.04LTS, Intel i7 8x2.7GHz, 16GB RAM). We used 
Python 2.7.6, PostgreSQL 9.3.10, Sesame 2.7.16 and GraphDB lite 
6.1. 
4.3 Experiment results 
We show the results for each image based on the frequency of 
mentions for the extended set of URLs. The X-Axis shows the 10 
minute segments within the first hour from the publication of the 
original image. The figures convey information about the 
popularity of the image, how and when it went viral and its 
credibility. 
We ran our experiment not only analysing attribution to 
(un)trusted sources but also authorship and mentions of (un)trusted 
sources. All of these experiments gave similar trends (albeit lower 
numbers) which is why we only show attribution to trusted sources 
as a representation for the entire experiment. 
 
Figure 2. Number of tweets mentioning the URLs of image P1 
in the first hour, attributed to unknown and (un)trusted 
sources and the total mentions of URLs and the tweet author 
  
 
5 e.g. http://twitter.com/BBCBreaking/lists/news-sources/members 
 P1 P2 P3 D1 D2 
professional account n y n y y 
# of followers 335 1.4k 218 2.8k 151k 
likes 11 408 35 17k 29k 
retweets 83 3.3k 194 22k 30k 
original crawled n y n y y 0
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Figure 3. Number of tweets mentioning the URLs of image P2 
in the first hour, attributed to unknown and (un)trusted 
sources and the total mentions of URLs and the tweet author 
 
Figure 4. Number of tweets mentioning the URLs of image P3 
in the first hour, attributed to unknown and (un)trusted 
sources and the total mentions of URLs and the tweet author 
 
 
Figure 5. Attribution to (un)trusted sources for P3.  
Figure 6. Number of tweets mentioning the URLs of image D1 
in the first hour, attributed to unknown and (un)trusted 
sources and the total mentions of URLs and the tweet author 
 
Figure 7. Number of tweets mentioning the URLs of image P1 
in the first hour, attributed to unknown and (un)trusted 
sources and the total mentions of URLs and the tweet author 
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Figure 8. Attribution to (un)trusted sources for D2. 
 
Table 2. Overview of referenced URLs in content items within 
the first 5 min segment after the original tweet was published 
and how many of them contained eyewitness material (using 
manual inspection) in the first 100 URLs 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
As shown in table 1, P1 comes from a civilian eyewitness. Apart 
from the tweet we investigated, he posted several other similar 
pictures of the shooting at the Paris bar "Le Carillon" as seen from 
his window. With relatively few followers, the image did not reach 
a bigger audience in the beginning. P2 has a higher volume and 
relates to the shootings at the café "Le Petit Cambodge". The author 
is a production assistant for a French TV channel and 
consequentially has more followers, resulting in a better spreading 
of the original image. P3 shows the café "La Belle Equipe" in Paris' 
Rue de Charonne with firefighters clearing the scene about 30 
minutes after the shooting. The author of is again a civilian with 
few followers. 
In image D1 the author is the official Twitter account of a US 
based news agency. "Herald de Paris" provides news in both 
English and French, drawing from journalists from external 
agencies around the world. Because it is ambiguously named, other 
users assumed it is a local newspaper. This assumption made it 
more credible than it actually is in this context, where it circulated 
a picture of the Eiffel Tower with the lights switched off. While 
locals know that this is the case every night at 1AM, the author 
made an effort to convince people it had happened in memory of 
the victims rather than to save electricity. With a high popularity, it 
managed to strike the chord of general sentiment in the chaos of the 
attacks. D2 is also a false rumour, relating to a gathering of people 
on the Place de la Republique, which took place after the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks in January 2015. It shows people holding up letters 
that spell out "NOT AFRAID". The author, a political journalist, 
has a large group of followers and knew about the impact an 
emotional message such as this would have on people around the 
world. The story got widely shared though the author never replied 
to verification questions asked by other journalists. It was debunked 
multiple times, with the first tweet only one minute later and a 
current photo showing the place empty 3 minutes after the original 
tweet was published. 
Overall, our experiments indicate that the veracity of a content 
item can be detected within the first hour after its publication. The 
results also show that analysing related content can help filter social 
media streams and help journalists discover new eyewitness 
content more efficiently. The following two paragraphs explain 
some of the reasons for this. 
P1, P2 and P3 are all images that turned out to be true. Figures 
2 and 3 show how content items started to attribute the image to 
trusted sources from the second temporal segment onwards (i.e. 
after 10-20 minutes). The fact that the author of P1 posted multiple, 
very similar pictures which were shared within few minutes of each 
other accounts for the difference between the amount of shared 
URLs and the total amount of relevant content items. While hints 
concerning the veracity can be observed early on, after about 50 
minutes, it becomes clear that this image is authentic. The author 
of P2 being a professional causes the image to spread more 
gradually. Neither P1 nor P2 show occurrences of untrusted 
sources. P3 starts spreading after about 30 minutes (see figure 4). It 
is different to P1 and P2 because the image is picked up by 
untrusted sources first, see figure 5. After 30 minutes however, it 
became popular quickly. The reason for this is that from about 
21:50, a link to a Mashable article was shared widely. Mashable 
links to the original tweet in its article. While very early on, the 
image was attributed to untrusted sources, presumably before being 
verified properly, trusted sources picked it up later, which suggests 
it has now been verified and is authentic after all. 
For the false rumours D1 and D2, figures 6, 7 and 8 show the 
absence of any trusted source during the first 60 minutes. For image 
D1, the reason is that after only 12 minutes, the rumour was 
debunked, with multiple other debunking tweets following in the 
course of the early morning. However, as some people stated in 
their comments to the tweet, despite being untrue, people a) trusted 
the news magazine thinking it was local ("I think I can trust the 
local news outlet to know why the Eiffel Tower lights were out.", 
@laura_payton), and b) realised the image was fake (i.e. out of 
context) but thought it was a nice symbol ("Me too! but I decided 
to play along", @dbrabyn). This fact seems to have sufficed as a 
justification for less trustworthy news sources to continue sharing 
the image long after it had been debunked. For D2, figure 7 shows 
a decline in overall popularity only 20 minutes after publication. 
This is caused by the very early debunk and the good availability 
of historic images via TinEye. Both images were not attributed to 
any trusted sources but some untrusted sources appear in the figures 
6 and 8, indicating that the tweet is a false rumour. 
In all cases, the diagrams present an indication of the veracity 
of the content item. This can help journalists early on to dismiss 
false rumours and pursue possible eyewitness accounts while 
giving them a chance to do so early on. 
Table 2 shows the results of the second experiment. The total 
amount of URLs gives an indication as to how high the volume of 
content items was during the 5 minute period following the 
publication of the original content item. One possible reason why 
this number grows is that D1 and D2 were posted much later. By 
that time, more people were talking about the attacks. The position 
of the image URLs in the list of shared URLs gives an indication 
as to how popular the item was in the first 5 minutes. Considering 
the total amount of shared URLs, this result is promising. It places 
all of the selected content items in the top 1-6%, meaning a 
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ext. URL 
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9/ 
653 
(2%) 
1/ 
603 
(1%) 
61/ 
1097 
(6%) 
427/ 
11605 
(4%) 
1/ 
11337 
(1%) 
total # of 
eyewitness 
content  
25 2 12 29 30 
unique # of 
eyewitness 
content 
4 1 4 13 14 
0
2
4
6
8
10 20 30 40 50 60
trusted/untrusted D2
trusted untrusted
co
n
te
n
t 
it
em
s 
[#
]
time [min]
journalist scanning a social media stream for newsworthy content 
would not have to check hundreds or thousands of URLs but could 
focus on the top URLs. We analysed each of the images separately, 
filtering only URLs from the 5 minute segment immediately 
preceding the current segment. However, when running this 
analysis over a prolonged period (e.g. for one evening), the filtering 
can be even more efficient. For each item, there is typically at least 
one duplicate item. This is because each image shared on Twitter 
has at least two URLs (the actual address of the image and a search-
engine optimised version of it) plus the URL of the tweet that 
contains the image. Manual identification of alternative URLs (i.e. 
before the new images are indexed by TinEye) can be one way of 
removing duplicate results. Additional filters using natural 
language processing to filter for eyewitness related text patterns can 
help improve this task further. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have done an analysis of the spreading of five widely shared 
images during the November 2015 Paris attacks. In our first 
experiments, we have investigated how alleged eyewitness content 
can be verified using attribution to (un)trusted entities. Our second 
experiment has demonstrated how filtering methods can be used to 
identify new content involving eyewitness accounts by filtering 
social media streams, adding value to already existing filtering 
methods like named entity extraction and natural language 
processing. 
Our methods help to semi-automate the verification process to 
support journalists using their best practices. For the verification 
task, this means we can support decision making based on 
qualitative evidence, like (un)trusted sources, rather than having to 
on popular topics or quantitative wisdom of the crowd as this would 
be too late into the story for it to be new enough. Identifying 
eyewitness content early helps to flag potentially interesting new 
content before it becomes popular or gets published by major news 
agencies while giving the journalist a chance to verify it properly 
before publishing. Obviously the performance is only as good as 
the list of (un)trusted sources but our work shows that even with 
just a smaller list, it is still possible to see trends in the credibility 
of a specific story within the first hour of it being published. 
While we have conducted our analysis in retrospective, 
ultimately this process is supposed to be run in real-time. The 
difference to our analysis will be that the data becomes known 
gradually. The user can select one or more news stories to follow 
with more data becoming available gradually, where the segment 
size could be variable though we found 10 minutes do deliver good 
results and considering the time in between the temporal segments 
is not idle but used for other verification and news discovery tasks 
while the amount of relevant content we identified is high enough 
to be rendered visually. 
We plan to extend the knowledge model to include other 
potentially relevant information used in verification today. This 
includes for example the development of natural language 
classifiers for geographical locations or weather conditions to help 
identify and exclude false rumours earlier on in the process. 
Furthermore, we are going to hold an ethnographic study 
involving professional journalists to evaluate the performance of 
our proposed trust model in comparison to current best practices. 
Ultimately, our goal is not to fully automate these journalistic 
tasks. All decisions lie with the journalist in the end. However, 
having analysed state of the art best practices, we are convinced 
there is a great potential to semi-automate particular subtasks which 
help journalists to filter large amounts of social media streams 
down into manageable amounts without compromising on the 
relevance of the filtered dataset. 
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